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ABSTRACT 
 
Corporate Governance is vital to the survival of any corporation. Because of its immense 
importance in both developed and developing countries, many recent studies noticed the 
need to enhance corporate governance in developing countries. Considering the case of 
Lebanon where corporate governance is not legally enforced, companies tend to neglect 
the importance of maintaining quality corporate governance. Several recent studies 
suggested the importance of existing interactions among the major components of 
corporate governance in any corporation and internal audits. This thesis seeks to explore 
the effects of corporate governance components’ on internal audit tasks in medium-
Large corporations in the Lebanese financial sector. The results showed that corporate 
governance components affect internal audit tasks. When the components are considered 
separately, top management and audit committee are found to have significant 
influences on the internal audit tasks whereas internal audit tasks are less influenced by 
external auditors and board of directors. On the other hand, when the four corporate 
governance components are jointly considered, their combined effect on internal audit 
tasks revealed that top management, audit committee, and external auditors significantly 
influence internal audit tasks. 
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Chapter I 
INTRODUCTION TO CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE 
 
This section highlights the overview and background of corporate governance, the need 
for undertaking this study, the research problem aimed to be investigated, the research 
objectives, the relevance of this study and finally the limitations. 
 
1.1 Overview and Background  
Corporate governance is generally known as a set of rules and regulations that is 
intended to increase the accountability of the corporation to protect it from bankruptcy; 
high-quality of corporate governance ensures that the company is being accountable and 
performing well (Shivdasani & Zenner, 2004). A remarkable move which led to 
increased interest about corporate governance was the collapse of large companies as 
Enron, WorldCom, and others; this resulted in a financial crisis since many companies 
shared the same characteristics as Enron (Niskanen, 2005). Thus, this shows why every 
corporation should have strong corporate governance. A recent study by Yuedong, 
Dong, & Xingyu (2014) was done to study the influence of corporate governance 
structure on internal audit. Although internal audit is considered a key part in controlling 
and protecting any company from bankruptcy and fraud, internal audits are being 
monitored by board of directors, external audits, top management, and the audit 
2 
 
committee (Yuedong, Dong, & Xingyu, 2014). That being the case, the current study 
seeks to determine the effectiveness of corporate governance components in relation to 
the functioning of internal audits in public and state-owned corporations in Lebanon.  
1.2  Need for the study 
Corporate governance became a demanding concern for every corporation. Taking the 
case of Lebanon since corporate governance is not legally required; companies tend to 
neglect the importance of maintaining quality corporate governance. Many points of 
view suggested the importance of existing interactions among the major components of 
corporate governance, such as board of directors, audit committee, top management, 
external audit, and internal audit. The latter is considered to be a resource for the other 
components (Mihret & Admassu, 2011). 
The purpose of this study is to determine which of these elements affects internal audits. 
First, the board of directors represents the shareholders in the company, so their interest 
might conflict with others. However, by supervising internal audits, this will influence 
internal audit tasks (Dawuda, 2010), so examining these effects will come up with the 
best coordination between both parties. Moreover, the audit committee has authority in 
the corporation over internal audit (DeZoort, et al., 2002); this relationship might affect 
internal audits, depending on the extent to which the audit committee influences internal 
audits tasks. Furthermore, top management is a major element in the corporation since 
the responsibilities of organizing and controlling all actions are their main duties 
(Institute of Directors, 2009). Thus, by presenting certain procedures and restricting 
them over internal audits, this would control the tasks accomplished by internal audits. 
The last component is external auditors. Many studies investigated the relationship 
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between external audits and internal audits. The article by Schneider (2009) highlights 
that in the presence of impartial guidance on the work and duties given to external and 
internal auditors. This will cause sharp dissatisfaction for the auditors involved. In 
addition, a survey was conducted for internal auditors, where it was reported that the 
work and efforts presented by internal auditors are not appreciated by external auditors 
(Schneider, 2009). Thus, examining the effects of external auditors on internal auditors 
is essential.  
 
1.3  Research Problem 
Due to many previous collapses of large organizations, corporate governance 
transformed into a demanding concern to every company. Therefore, a high level of 
corporate governance must be achieved (Niskanen, 2005). In addition , many studies 
have shown the importance for maintaining good corporate governance so that it gains 
public confidence. However, the Lebanese private and public sectors still don’t consider 
corporate governance as an important and obligatory mechanism since it is not legally 
required. The major issues are the need to enhance the corporate governance, but since 
corporate governance considers the balance of interest between its stakeholders 
(management, financiers, shareholders, etc.), the effect of such components should be 
examined on internal audits that are responsible for fraud detection (Mensah, et al., 
2003). 
1.4      Research Objectives 
This study aims to examine and analyze the major influences applied by the audit 
committee, board of directors, external audits, and top management on internal audits. 
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1.5  Relevance of the Study 
Upon completion, this study will demonstrate the effects imposed on internal audits in 
the Lebanese corporations. By presenting such impacts, high level decision makers in 
any corporation will be able to minimize or maximize the existence of such effects on 
internal audits. Moreover, this research complements prior studies that stated the 
existence of these effects on internal audits, where the work of internal audits had been 
restricted by each of the board of directors, audit committee, top management and 
external auditors. The study will state the important role internal audits have on any 
corporation since they detect any fraud in the financial statements. Also, this study will 
focus on improving the role of each corporate governance component to better govern 
any corporation. 
 
1.6  Limitation of the Study 
The questionnaire pursues the opinion of different employee levels; each employee had 
to answer from the point of view based on their department. As a result, the employee 
showed minimal level of interest in the study performed. Thus, the design of the 
questionnaire created some limitations on the study. Also, the employees, who 
participated in the study, were all located in Beirut, where big firms are all located. For 
example, small companies, established outside the capital, won’t perform the different 
functions of corporate governance. Also, if the major companies are not implementing 
good governance, smaller companies won’t implement it. Thus, the main focus was on 
the leading companies operating in Lebanon to complete this study. 
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Chapter II 
PRIOR STUDIES 
 
In the next section, the following elements will be discussed: the literature review and 
the hypotheses aimed to be tested. The literature review is divided into three parts: 
corporate governance, corporate governance components (board of directors, audit 
committee, top management and external audits) and internal audit tasks.  
 
2.1  Literature Review 
Corporate governance 
 
In 1992, a report was issued by Sir Adrian Cadbury on Corporate Governance. In this 
report, he examined the main reasons for the liquidity of many companies in that time, 
and the effects of this financial crisis. In addition, he suggested that corporate 
governance must be focused on directing and monitoring corporations (Cadbury, 1992). 
Similarly, corporate governance is defined as a method that clearly shows a plan to 
accomplish corporation’s objectives and to control performance in the company 
(Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2004). According to Parker 
(2007), the outflow of corporate bankruptcy and frauds boosted the interest of 
companies to have major concentration on directors and managers, and accounting 
professions. In general, companies tend to mandate additional auditing to better guard 
themselves from financial misrepresentations, since corporate governance principles are 
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considered one of the best ways to shrink the financial risk that companies are exposed 
to (Fama, 1998). Moreover, the Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA) stated in 2006 that by 
employing good corporate governance principles, companies tend to attain the objectives 
of sustainable administration and accountability to their owners (IIA, 2006). Therefore, 
this provoked public-owned and certified companies to track the worldwide trend to 
establish a series of regulatory standards for corporate governance. In a similar manner, 
the Lebanese Code of Corporate Governance stated that companies should establish a 
good internal system by maintaining the principles of corporate governance so this will 
increase the earnings of companies, attract new investors and achieve a core competency 
among other corporations. This code was published by the Lebanese Transparency 
Association. It is considered a reference to appraise the tasks achieved by the corporate 
governance components (LCCG, 2006). Also, the report provided by the Lebanese 
Transparency Association assisted many other countries throughout the Middle East to 
establish similar codes (LCCG, 2006). 
 
 It is considered that corporate governance is a combination of several components such 
as the board of directors that monitors the organizational professionals and the audit 
committee who aims is to maintain organizational functioning and objectives (Rezaee, 
2005). Also, Khanchel (2007) stated in her article that what attains an organizational 
governance structure is the board of directors, audit committee, external audits, internal 
audits as well as top management. Thus, effective corporate governance relies on having 
a well performing board of directors and managers, solid internal and external audits and 
independent board members (Mihăilescu & Ducu, 2011).  
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Corporate Governance Components 
 
Board of Directors 
 
Several studies were aimed to evaluate the components of corporate governance. 
According to King II Principles, maintaining independence by the board of directors’ 
members will achieve the standards toward good corporate governance (Institute of 
Directors, 2002). Therefore, independent directors tend to be more effective in 
controlling the accomplishments by the corporation (Bhagat & Black, 2001). Also, 
meetings should be prepared and scheduled directly by the board members when the 
conditions require direct actions and control (Shivdasani & Zenner, 2004). Additionally, 
King II report states that the board members meetings must vary from one to four 
meetings annually, in order to check the company’s performance (Institute of Directors, 
2002). 
The board of directors acts as representatives of shareholders in the corporation and its 
main goal is to ensure the best outcome to all stakeholders (Ayuso & Argandona, 2009). 
However, by overseeing the internal audit task, this will influence its efficiency. Thus, 
examining these effects is essential to come up with the best coordination between board 
of directors and internal audits (Alkhafaji, 2007). Moreover, Beng (2009) supports that 
particularly the board of directors and the audit committee have a major impact on 
monitoring internal control deficiencies. Moreover, having a strategic oversight role 
would allow the board of directors to control threats faced by the company. 
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According to Cadbury (1992), one of the main duties of the board of directors is to 
maintain sufficient accounting records. The board needs to sustain a proper internal 
control system that includes procedures intended to minimize fraud risks. Besides 
preventing and detecting fraud, the duty of the board is to guard the assets of the 
corporation. However, as identified in the auditing regulations the auditor’s duty is to 
accurately plan, complete and estimate his audit tasks, so the board could have a logical 
probability of perceiving misstatements in the financial reports (Fraser & Henry, 2007). 
Also, Shivdasani & Zenner (2004) claim that board forums serve to share information on 
the corporation plans, performance, and strategies. Therefore, researchers suggest that 
boards should equate the costs and profits of the board’s meetings and ought to be eager 
to increase their meeting when the situation necessitates the board’s supervision. When 
the board increases their meetings, this could reveal poor performance in the 
corporation.  
According to King III, it is a legal obligation of the board of directors to perform at the 
best outcome of the corporation. However, the board has an option to decide to apply 
what best suits the company and still achieve fairness, responsibility, accountability, and 
transparency which are the values of good corporate governance. Thus, the board must 
guarantee that debates and choices are based on maintaining valuable corporate 
governance and sustaining a good financial performance (Institute of Directors, 2009). 
Also, Xie et al. (2003) declare that due to the increase in the size of board of directors 
and the meeting held by them, the higher the problems are in the corporation. In other 
words, the internal audits will tend to do more tests in order to maintain a good image to 
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the board of directors and prove that processes are implemented for fraud detection. This 
will result in a higher cost on the company because of failure to detect the true problems 
when all the focus is on the board of directors meetings. 
Moreover, the board needs to ensure that the corporation has an independent and 
efficient audit committee, and also must guarantee that the company has an effective 
internal audit function. The board must provide a report on the function of internal audits 
to maintain a good internal control structure.  Also, the internal audits must present a 
report on the internal control system to the board of directors (Institute of Directors, 
2009). 
Furthermore, an annual report, done by a qualified internal auditor, must be presented to 
the board to show an objective reassertion. To clarify, the financial data is fairly 
presented in the company and the best results are performed (OECD, 2004) 
 
Audit Committee 
An audit committee is a self-governing group that involves experts from different areas 
in the organization. It has an important role in endorsing good corporate governance, so 
it is considered one of the main pillars of corporate governance (Badara & Saidin, 2013). 
Such committees are responsible for several tasks in the company, such achieving 
accuracy of financial data, having an effective internal and external audit tasks and 
preventing fraud from the company (El-Kassar, Elgammal, & Bayoud, 2014). Also, the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act describes the audit committee as a group elected by the board of 
directors to supervise financial reporting and accounting data. Nowadays, the audit 
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committee’s role in supervising audits and auditors is more perceptible and demanding. 
In other words, it is considered as one of the most dependable sentinel in the corporation 
(Levitt, 2000). 
Davies (2009) investigates the existence of an effective relationship between the audit 
committee and internal audits is a must, if they worked as a team. However, the audit 
committee has more authorities in the corporation by evaluating the internal audit task 
and appointing the head of internal audits (Davies, 2009). 
Moreover, Mohamad-Nor et al. (2010), reveal that the effectiveness of the audit 
committee influences the effectiveness of internal audit task. Also, a Karamanou & 
Vafeas (2005) highlight that an audit committee must offer assistance to the internal 
audit tasks to achieve expansion in the overall audit function. Furthermore, Bishop, et al. 
(2000) argue that an operative collaboration between audit committee and internal audits 
is an important section for good corporate governance. The existence of this relationship 
is essential because of the mutual strengthening function both have. Moreover, the audit 
committee duty is to maintain the independency of internal audits (Goodwin & Yeo, 
2001). 
Both Sarens & De Beelde (2006) examine the reason why audit committees ask for the 
support of internal audits. First, the audit committee’s main aim is to achieve a satisfied 
level of comfort, so its target is to monitor other components such as internal audit to 
work at its best interest (Beasley et al., 2009). The European Union directive mentions 
on legal audit that maintaining a good relationship between both audit committees and 
internal audits aims to enhance the financial quality and minimize risk. Also, it is stated 
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that audit committee must evaluate the financial reporting of internal audits (European 
Union Directive, 2006). 
Moreover, previous research done by Raghunandan (2001) and Scarbrough et al. (1998) 
argues that regular communication must exist between both the audit committee and 
internal audits to inform and give a deep knowledge to the audit committee about 
auditing and accounting issues. Having this relationship is an important resource for the 
corporation because the high internal audit quality task can discharge the audit 
committee responsibilities and improve its effectiveness. Besides, since the internal 
audit’s task can reduce the problems that exist between the audit committee and 
employees in the corporation, the audit committee aims to monitor the internal audit task 
to perform at its best interest. Additionally, new qualitative studies by Gendron et al. 
(2004), Gendron & Be’dard (2006), and Beasley et al. (2009) prove that meetings of the 
audit committee involves practices, which aim to comfort the members regarding the 
accuracy of financial data and the quality of task done by internal audits. Furthermore, 
Gendron et al. (2004) discuss that the audit committee at different Canadian state-owned 
corporations relied on the task performed by the internal audits to expand their own 
approval, if the internal control at the corporation is effective. 
  Additionally, the recent study done by Gendron & Bédard (2006) concludes that the 
audit committee teams perform various actions with internal audit reports to achieve 
their own comfort of corporation’s internal control. Also, this study found evidence 
supporting that internal audit should provide detailed knowledge to the audit committee 
in order to enhance internal controls. Thus, an informal way of communication must 
exist between the head of internal auditors and the chairperson of the audit committee, 
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so that the concerns of the committee would be raised. Hence, this led to improved 
governance by reporting to the audit committee (Gendron & Bédard, 2006). 
The audit committee regularly focuses on several details. Since the committee doesn’t 
have enough interaction with the company, it insists on having interactions with the 
internal auditor so it can have better planning (Beasley et al., 2009). 
According to Carrington & Catasu (2007), the audit committee seeks comfort when it 
comes to internal controls. In order to forbid any discomfort, the audit committee 
contributes to the forecasts of internal audits. The committee expects the internal audits 
to analyze the value of internal control system by following its recommendations. Also, 
the head of internal audits reveals that specific requests are suggested by the audit 
committee which turned out to be a precedence that is included in the plan of internal 
audits. When the audit committee believes the internal audit tasks can improve internal 
controls, they monitor their tasks to achieve this improvement. Besides, Christopher et 
al. (2009) argue that internal audits staff tasks are appraised by the chairperson of the 
audit committee, who is also responsible for allocating or discharging the head of 
internal audits.  
 
Furthermore, the Lebanese Code of Corporate Governance (2006), states that the 
mission of the audit committee should be to plan and evaluate the corporation’s financial 
reports and accounts. Also, the committee must review internal audits financial reports, 
and prepare a detailed annual report that will be reviewed by the board of directors 
before adding to the corporation’s annual report (Lebanese Code of Corporate 
Governance, 2006). 
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Listed by King III, the audit committee is responsible for supervising the internal audits 
by approving the internal audit plan. To clarify, the performance of the auditors is 
evaluated by the committee. The duties of the audit committee include managing the 
financial reporting threats, enhancing internal control, detecting fraud risks, and 
appraising the effectiveness of the internal audit practices (Institute of Directors, 2009). 
Moreover, Beasley et al. (2009) deduced that informal meetings, set with auditors, tend 
to influence their tasks since the audit committee is prone to ask probing questions. 
In addition, a study was performed by interviewing several auditors regarding the impact 
of other corporate governance components on the auditing procedure, and the 
researchers mainly focused on the influence of the audit committee. The results were 
that many of the auditors look at audit committees as ineffective and weak (Cohen et al., 
2002). However, Cohen et al. (2010) updated the 2002 study by questioning more 
auditors after the financial scandal of Enron and the increased interest on corporate 
governance; they found out the opinion of auditors on audit committees changed to 
considering them more powerful, experts, and active. 
Besides, it was realized that committee members depend greatly on both internal and 
external auditors. In view of the fact that audit committees don’t desire the responsibility 
of detecting fraud, they want to act as vigilant supervisors of internal audits because 
detecting fraud is beyond their limit (Beasley et al., 2009). 
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Top Management 
 
In any corporation, corporate governance is a set of mechanism intended to authorize 
high level decisions, and shrink the agency conflict. Thus, maintaining effective 
corporate governance ensures that management is acting at the best interest of 
shareholders (Jizi, M, 2015). Agency conflict states that managers in the corporation 
might tend to misuse their authorities against the shareholders. Thus, the board of 
directors must supervise managers and control their power (Jizi, et al., 2014). 
As mentioned earlier, after the financial scandal of Enron, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was 
agreed on that top management was required to report any important changes in internal 
controls (Beng, 2009). Top management is a major element in the corporation since the 
responsibilities of organizing and controlling all actions are among their main duties. 
Thus, by presenting certain procedures and restricting them over internal audits, this 
would control the tasks accomplished by internal audits (Fraser & Henry, 2007). Top 
management must establish effective and accurate control procedures and implement 
them over internal audits (Alkhafaji, 2007). 
Leventis et al. (2005) argue that top managers should take a good perceptive of the 
internal audit report so that they can apply procedures to enhance the audit report 
equally. Also, Stuart (2008) describes agency theory as the conflicts that occur between 
both managers and owners of the corporations since owners require management to act 
in their best interests. However, Adams (1994) mentions agency theory to clarify that 
management aims to have a strong internal audit unit. Also, he adds that continuous 
communications exist between management and internal auditors, so the tasks of 
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internal auditors must not be dominated by top management and no interference should 
exist by the management to influence the audit outcomes (Adams, 1994). 
The Institute of Internal Auditors explains that the internal auditors should get their 
power and duties from the charter, but not receive orders from top management. Also, 
top management must coordinate with internal audits since this coordination is 
consistent to what extent these auditors can achieve the company objectives. Therefore, 
the assurance and support of top management is crucial to have an effective internal 
audit function (Institute of Internal Auditors, 2006). 
Both Mihret & Yismaw (2007) declare that when top management fails to implement 
internal audit’s suggestions, this has an impact on the auditor’s attitude to improve audit 
value, and their commitment to achieve the objectives of the company. Moreover, both 
authors added that the findings and results suggested by internal audits won’t be 
effective unless they were implemented by top management. The results of these studies 
implied that managers who don’t perceive the internal audit tasks attractive to them, 
would lead to have a low internal audit performance. Thus, it is realized that internal 
auditors don’t get the required assistance from management due to interferences of top 
management in the duties of internal auditors (Dawuda, 2010). 
Also, Cadbury (1992) highlights an additional problem, faced by internal auditors, is that 
when top management is involved in the deception they don’t have the required proof to 
support their doubts. Here, the task performed by internal audit would be affected since 
they are not in a strong position to face top management or report to the proper 
authority. 
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Furthermore, Guruswamy (2012) examines in his article that coordination usually exists 
between top management and internal auditors, where auditors provide assurance that 
there’s an appropriate internal control system and that procedures are efficiently and 
effectively performed. Therefore, in order to attain these procedures, internal auditors 
must complete their tasks separately with no management pressure. Besides, in his 
study, the findings reveal that the relationship between top management and internal 
auditors is hard to identify since they both are not achieving their duties in cooperation 
with each other. Thus, this affects the overall operational effectiveness and competence 
of the corporation. Meanwhile, this could be explained by the task performed by internal 
audits where their main focus in on maintaining internal control system rather than 
improving work performance and services supervised by top management (Guruswamy, 
2012). 
Also, Stuart (2008) ensures that even the most professional and skilled internal auditors 
won’t be effective if they were demoralized by top management. Also, according to an 
audit committee chairman, the majority of members in the corporation will appreciate 
good tasks done by an internal auditor, so it’s better to be fast in reporting problems 
rather than negotiating them with top management (Stuart, 2008). 
 
External Auditors 
Currently, internal audits are an important component for every organization. On the 
other hand, external auditors heavily depend on internal auditors’ accomplished work to 
complete their external audit tasks since both parties aim to achieve a proper internal 
control system (Guruswamy, 2012). According to Diamond’s (2002) recent study, more 
17 
 
importance and interest have been placed on the internal audit tasks. Enron, WorldCom, 
and other companies have boosted the awareness to maintain a good accounting 
procedure and internal audit task. Moreover, Xiangddong (1997) emphasizes that the 
duties performed by internal audits have an important role in promoting good corporate 
governance, upholding an advantage over external audits in acquiring information 
promptly and discovering problems at a prior stage. 
When mentioning external auditors, one can consider their job different from that of the 
internal audits. For example, Schneider (2009) investigates the relationship between 
external audits and internal audits. He discusses that coordinating work between external 
and internal audits would lead to more effective reviews at a lower cost. Also, Mihret & 
Admassu (2011) state that both auditors must organize tasks together in order to avoid 
wasting time on tasks previously performed. However, many problems were 
encountered because of this coordination mainly attributable to external auditors. In the 
presence of impartial guidance on the work and duties given to external and internal 
auditors, this will cause a severe dissatisfaction for the auditors involved (Schneider, 
2009). In addition, a survey was conducted for internal auditors where it was reported 
that the work and efforts presented by internal audits were not appreciated by external 
auditors. Internal-external auditor effectiveness could be achieved if both coordinated 
tasks between each other to improve corporate governance (Mihret & Admassu, 2011). 
Nevertheless, of external auditors believe that internal auditors are their assistants since 
they represent one part of internal control (Mihret & Admassu, 2011). But according to 
Institute of Internal Audits (2009), internal audit tasks are seen as independent and their 
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objectives are designed to sustain assessment and enhance the operations of the 
company.  
Also, the efforts of internal and external auditors should match each other since both 
serve to achieve common objectives of the company’s internal control system, such as 
preventing or detecting errors and fraud and preparing financial reports that imitate 
factual and integrity vision of the company (Dawuda, 2010). Furthermore, the head of 
internal audits should enhance the relationship with external auditors by exchanging 
information on threats, sharing work performed and discussing problems identified; this 
aims to enhance the relationship between both parties into an effective one (Sarens & De 
Beelde, 2006).  
The internal auditors report to the audit committee or high-level management, but the 
external auditors report to the company’s members. According to Institute of Internal 
Audits (1999), in spite of the differences between both, external auditors can’t perform 
without the help of internal auditors since they are perceived as the “eyes of the 
company”. Thus, with the coordination of internal auditors, the external auditors can 
perform their audit duties on time. Also, it is important to state that the external auditors’ 
reliance on internal auditors depends on the extent to which the internal audit component 
is effective. 
 
Internal Audit Tasks 
In response to the financial scandals and the Sarbanes-Oxley act, several corporations 
are powering their internal audit units and giving them independence from top level 
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authorities (Kaplan & Schultz, 2007). Internal audit task is considered as the first line of 
defense in the corporation to promote good financial reporting (Wangui, 2012). Today, 
with the increasing size of many corporations, the auditing role is highlighted to improve 
internal control, discover incorrect financial records and accounting transactions and 
achieve productive corporation control (Belay, 2007). Internal audit is an independent 
element, which aims to achieve assessment and to enhance the operations of the 
company (Institute of Internal Audits, 1999). This shift denotes that internal audit went 
from being only concerned about a company’s accountability to enhancing the future 
results in order to function more successfully (Nagy & Cenker, 2002); (Stern, 1994); 
(Goodwin, 2004). Also, Goodwin (2004) added that the definition stated by the Institute 
of Internal Audits aims to promote good corporate governance in both private and public 
companies. Besides, the IIA aims to promote the internal audit tasks as an essential 
component in corporate governance. This was illustrated by providing a new definition 
for internal audits, where they stated that internal audits as a component which assists 
the company in achieving its objectives and enhance the effectiveness of governance 
procedures, internal control, and risk management (IIA, 1999). This shows that an 
internal audit department which dynamically obeys the definition and follows the 
Standards of IIA will give the company the ability to support the board of directors and 
audit committee since it is a vital component for their control systems (ECIIA, 2005). 
Pickett (2004) mentioned that today the high interest of corporations has shifted toward 
internal audit; earlier internal audit tasks were considered as a method to review 
thousands of financial records. However, nowadays internal auditors tend to focus on 
eliminating fraud and controlling risk management. This great shift was reasoned by the 
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uncertain surroundings in which corporations function (Pickett, 2004). Therefore, 
currently, internal audits should focus on risk management and control, which means 
preventing mistakes and fraud rather than detecting them. As well, Dittenhofer (2001) 
states that maintaining a good quality level of internal audit tends to contribute to the 
success of duties in the company. 
Currently, auditors provide comfort to different departments at the corporation since 
they protect the company from fraudulent statements. Therefore, a world in the absence 
of auditing and accounting unquestionably is a cause of uncertainty (Pentland, 1993). 
Moreover, internal auditors had expanded more appreciation from the stakeholders, 
since internal audit is concerned with the corporate governance procedures (Mihăilescu 
& Ducu, 2011). Also, stakeholders seek verification that internal audits perform their job 
on an accurately skilled structure, so it is vital for the financial institutions to specifically 
announce that they structured the internal audit tasks (Mihăilescu & Ducu, 2011). 
However, many recent studies suggested the importance of existing interactions among 
the major components of corporate governance, such as audit committee, board of 
directors, external audit, top management and internal audit; internal audit is considered 
to be a resource for the other components (Mihret & Admassu, 2011). In other words, 
investors always seek assurance for their investments to be productive.  In order to 
always attract investors several companies have depended on corporate governance 
components, so the absence of existing interactions between the components provides a 
good situation for ineffective tasks to thrive (Mensah, et al., 2003). Also, a recent study 
by Fraser & Henry (2007) examines the effects of corporate governance structure on 
internal audit. It states that companies that have a bigger size of audit committees and 
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board of directors, a cooperative relationship between external audits and internal audits 
and management support, influences the relationship with internal audits. However, 
placing an important role on the company’s board of directors, audit committees, and 
internal audits is one of the major current developments in corporate governance to 
protect the corporation from any embedded risk (Fraser & Henry, 2007). Besides, 
effective corporate governance involves having an appropriate relationship between 
board, management and audit professionals to pursue objectives that serve the best of the 
company (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2004). 
Similarly, Sarens (2009), Belay (2007), Goodwin-Stewart & Kent (2006), and Gramling 
et al. (2004) have expressed multiple views regarding internal audits. Some points of 
view argue that internal audit is a main component of corporate’s internal control. On 
the other hand, while others view internal audit tasks as a way to enhance the board’s 
control through evaluating threats and enhancing internal control. In other words, 
internal audits are being monitored by other factors in the corporation; they should get a 
proper support from the audit committees, board of directors, and management since 
their presence would improve the internal control and reduce fraud and error. Thus, to 
achieve the internal audit independence, a good cooperation must exist with the 
corporate governance components (Guruswamy, 2012). 
Presently, internal audit functions on different levels. First, it gives an independent 
evaluation concerning the corporate governance structure (Institute of Internal Audits, 
2009). On the other hand, internal auditors are eager for change, so they provide 
suggestions in order to support corporate governance components (Millichamp, 2002). 
Moreover, top management and board of directors control multiple systems in order to 
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accomplish effective corporate governance. Therefore, internal auditors can enhance the 
procedure by supporting management and the board (Mihăilescu & Ducu, 2011). Also, 
stated by the King Code of Governance, internal audit is a main tool in the corporation 
for governance. Each year, internal auditors must provide a written evaluation to the 
board of directors regarding the system of internal controls and risk management. Also, 
internal audits must provide assessment to the audit committee on the internal control 
effectiveness. Thus, by providing this evaluation annually, certain effects are to be 
enforced on the internal audit quality tasks (Institute of Directors, 2009). Furthermore, 
internal audits is supposed to sustain the corporation’s governance procedures, maintain 
an internal control structure, submit information concerning fraud, dishonesty and 
irregularities and most importantly adhere to the Institute of Internal Audit Standards 
(Institute of Directors, 2009). 
In addition, it is stated by the Lebanese Code of Corporate Governance (2006) that the 
board of directors must set up an effective system for internal audits, where the internal 
audit tasks will be monitored by a top level manager and he will report directly to the 
board. Also, it is required from the head of internal audits to provide a report to the audit 
committee that includes financial reports, and to coordinate tasks with external auditors. 
Dawuda (2010) stated in his article that the internal audits objectives in the company are 
to assist managers, board of directors, audit committee and coordinate duties with 
external audits.  
As a conclusion from the listed definitions mentioned earlier, there is no single 
recognized description for corporate governance. However, the majority of these 
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definitions listed the four components of corporate governance: board of directors, audit 
committee, top management, and external auditors to promote sound corporate 
governance. 
A previous study (El-Kassar, et al., 2014), showed the effects of internal audit on 
corporate governance quality taking the four components mentioned above. The paper 
showed existing effects of internal audit on the audit committee, and top management. 
However, no influence from internal audits was found on the board of directors and on 
external auditors. One of this paper’s recommendations was to prove the opposite of 
what was previously tested. The recommendation was to investigate if the board of 
directors, audit committee, external audits, and top management influence internal audit 
tasks, which is the objective of the current study. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Conceptual framework 
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2.2  Hypotheses 
After stating the purpose of this study, and according to prior tests examined, the 
following hypotheses are to be tested: 
Board of Directors: 
H1: The Board of Directors has a significant effect on Internal Audit Function. 
H1a: The Board of Directors has a significant effect on the independence of the internal 
audit function. 
H1b: The Board of Directors has a significant effect on the reliability of the internal audit 
function. 
H1c: The Board of Directors has a significant effect on the qualifications of staff in the 
internal audit function. 
 
Audit Committee: 
H2:  The Audit Committee has a significant influence on the effectiveness of the Internal 
Audit tasks. 
H2a:  The Audit Committee has a significant influence on the independence of internal 
audits. 
H2b: The Audit Committee has a significant influence on the reliability of internal audits. 
H2c: The Audit Committee has a significant influence on the qualifications of internal 
audits. 
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Top Management: 
H3: Top Management procedures have a significant impact on internal audits tasks. 
H3a: Top Management procedures have a significant impact on the independence of 
internal audit tasks. 
H3b: Top Management procedures have a significant impact on the reliability of internal 
audit tasks. 
H3c: Top Management procedures have a significant impact on the qualifications of 
internal audit tasks. 
 
External Auditors: 
H4: The external auditors have a significant influence on the performance of internal 
audits. 
H4a: The external auditors have a significant influence on the independence of internal 
audits. 
H4b: The external auditors have a significant influence on the reliability of internal audits. 
H4c: The external auditors have a significant influence on the qualifications of internal 
audit staff. 
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Chapter III 
METHODOLOGY 
 
In this section, the methodology of this study is presented. It includes definition of 
variables, measurement techniques, sample, data collection, and statistical methods. 
3.1 Definition of Variables 
The measured variables were obtained from the previous stated hypotheses. These 
variables were also stated in the questionnaire, so the collected data would be relevant to 
perform the study. The measured variables are the components of corporate governance: 
Board of Directors, Audit Committee, Top Management, and External Auditors, and 
also the Internal Audit Task. 
The Independent Variables: Board of Directors, Audit Committee, Top Management, 
and External Auditors. 
The Dependent Variable: Internal Audit Task, and its sub-measures: Internal Audit 
Independence, Internal Audit Reliability, and Internal Audit Qualification. 
In order to conduct the statistical analysis, scores were constructed to measure the 
Corporate Governance Effectiveness score (CGES) and Internal Audit Effectiveness 
score (IAES). These scores were obtained from the set of questions related to corporate 
governance components and internal audit tasks. In addition to the overall effectiveness 
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score, based on factor analysis done in a previous study by (El-Kassar, et al., 2014) sub-
measures were identified. 
The scores are obtained as follows: 
Part I: Questions related to the Corporate Governance components effectiveness: CGES 
which is the sum of the corporate governance components set of questions. 
 BDES: Board of Directors Effectiveness score is the average of questions (1-4) 
 ACES: Audit Committee Effectiveness score is the average of questions (5-10) 
 TMES: Top Management Effectiveness score is the average of questions (11-12) 
 EAES: External Auditors Effectiveness score is the average of questions (13-14) 
Part II: Questions related to Internal Audit Tasks effectiveness: IAES which is the sum 
of internal audit quality task set of questions. 
 IAIS: Internal Audit Independence score is the average of questions (1-4) 
 IARS: Internal Audit Reliability score is the average of questions (5-9) 
 IAQS: Internal Audit Qualifications score is the average of questions (10-14) 
 
3.2 Measurement Techniques 
A convenient previous questionnaire was designed referring to the study done by 
ElKassar, et al. (2014). All sections of the questionnaire were used since it is related to 
the variables measured in this study. 
The questionnaire was divided into three parts. The first section includes the 
demographical data of the respondent (gender, age, degree level, specialization, years of 
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experience, and professional certificate). The second section includes the effectiveness 
of the components of corporate governance. The third section includes the internal audit 
effectiveness tasks. 
The questionnaire was designed to take about a maximum of 5 minutes from the 
respondent’s time, so that the number of participants would increase and shrink 
decliners. 
3.3 Sample 
Convenient sampling was used in this study. First, secondary data was obtained from the 
previous questionnaire used. The target segment was the working population, generally 
the age group of 21 and above working in different levels and departments, such as 
accounting/auditing department, business administration department, financial 
department etc… in the Lebanese financial sector. 
Data were collected using convenience sampling and were added to this research. Out of 
150 questionnaires distributed, 103 completed the survey. The respondents included 40 
auditors, 8 audit firm, 20 banks, 10 universities, and 25 accountants. 
Hence, the sample used to conduct the study consists of a total of 103 respondents. 
3.4 Data Collection 
The data collection method was quantitative. 
The respondents were first contacted through phone calls to get their personal emails. 
Then the questionnaire was directly sent by email to the selected candidates. The 
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candidates were followed up so that the maximum number of respondents can be 
targeted. 
3.5 Statistical Methods 
The data were analyzed using the SPSS statistical program, in order to identify the 
relation between the independent and dependent variables. Correlation was used to 
identify the relationship between each corporate governance components and each sub-
measure of internal audit tasks. Also, multiple regression, and backward elimination 
regression were used to identify the relationship of the four corporate governance 
components on each internal audit tasks sub-measure.  
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Chapter IV 
ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
In this section, several statistical techniques were performed to test the previous stated 
hypotheses. These techniques include: descriptive statistics, correlation analysis, 
multiple regression, and backward elimination regression. 
4.1     Descriptive Statistics 
We begin by presenting the descriptive analysis. The SPSS (predictive analysis 
software) output for the descriptive statics for gender showed the following. 
 
Figure 2: Descriptive gender statistics 
 
The majority of the respondents are males (79.60%), and 20.40% of the respondents are 
females. 
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The SPSS output of age showed the following:  
 
 
Figure 3: Descriptive age statistics 
Based on the results, 69.90% of the respondents are between 30 and 40 years old, while 
17.50% of the respondents are over the age of 40, and 12.60% of the respondents are 
less than 30 years old. 
 
The following results show the degree level of the respondents: 
 
Figure 4: Descriptive degree level statistics 
According to the degree level, the majority of the respondents hold a master’s degree 
(62.1%). While the rest of the respondents either have bachelor degree (26.2%), 
baccalaureate degree (6.8%), and PhD degree (4.9%). 
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The below figure states the specialization of the respondent: 
 
Figure 5: Descriptive specialization statistics 
 
Both business administration (44.70%) and Accounting and Auditing (43.7%) majors 
are close to each other. 6.80% of the respondents specialized in banking, and 5% in 
another set. 
Based on the SPSS output for descriptive statistics for experience the following could be 
stated: 
 
Figure 6: Descriptive years of experience statistics 
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The majority of the respondents have a minimum of 10 years’ experience, 46.6% have 
either (5-10 years) or more than 10 years. On the other side 6.8% only of the 
respondents have less than 5 years’ experience. 
The below figure shows the certificate of the respondents: 
 
Figure 7: Descriptive Personal Certificate Statistics 
The SPSS output showed that 47.6% of the respondents have a Certified Public 
Accounting (CPA), 39.8% of the respondents don’t hold a certificate, 6.8% of the 
respondents hold a Certified Internal Auditor (CIA), and 5.8% of the respondents hold a 
Chartered Financial Analyst (CFA). 
According to the demographics statistics, it can be deduced that the majority of the 
respondents are qualified employees with expertise in the financial field. The sample 
targeted is knowledgeable, highly educated, mature, specialized in both accounting and 
auditing and business administration which means they make a qualified sample to 
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complete this survey. Thus, according to these data provided, this increases the 
reliability of the responses and the respective conclusion that could be driven. 
For each corporate governance component and each group of items related to the 
internal audits sub-measures, reliability analysis was conducted. The Cronbach’s alpha 
values obtained were as follows: 0.832 for IAIS, 0.7255 IARS, 0.855 IAES, 0.777 
IAQS, 0.854 CGES, 0.925 BDES, 0.725 TMES, and 0.866 EAES. 
Since all Cronbach’s alpha values were above the threshold of 0.7, we can conclude that 
the data is reliable and further analysis can be conducted. 
The SPSS output for descriptive statistics scores are listed in the following table: 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
IAES 103 3.71 4.79 4.3363 .23725 
IAIS 103 3.75 5.00 4.3908 .31829 
IARS 103 3.60 5.00 4.2874 .34376 
IAQS 103 3.20 5.00 4.3417 .42160 
CGES 103 3.43 4.79 4.3433 .31677 
BDES 103 3.50 5.00 4.3131 .32973 
ACES 103 3.33 5.00 4.2783 .46582 
TMES 103 4.00 5.00 4.7282 .44709 
EAES 103 3.00 5.00 4.2136 .58829 
Valid N (listwise) 103     
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of Corporate Governance Components score and 
Internal Audits sub-measures score 
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Descriptive statistics on internal audit tasks 
Based on a 5-point Likert scale obtained from SPSS, Table 1 shows the mean of internal 
audits effectiveness scores (IAES) is 4.33, the mean of internal audits independence 
score (IAIS) is 4.39, the mean of internal audits reliability score (IARS) is 4.28, and the 
mean of internal audits qualifications score (IAQS) is 4.34. Thus, the averages of 
internal audits effectiveness score and its sub-measures varied between 4.28-4.40. This 
average implies that the companies operating in Lebanon have high concern about 
achieving highly effective internal audit tasks, ensures on maintaining the independence 
of internal audits, have reliable internal audits, and retain highly qualified internal audit 
staff. 
Descriptive statistics of corporate governance components  
Based on a 5-point Likert scale the mean of corporate governance effectiveness score 
(CGES) is 4.34, the mean of board of directors effectiveness score (BDES) is 4.31, the 
mean of audit committee effectiveness score (ACES) is 4.27, the mean of top 
management effectiveness score (TMES) is 4.72, and the mean of external auditors 
effectiveness score (EAES) is 4.21. Thus, the averages of corporate governance 
effectiveness score and its components varied between 4.21-4.73. This average implies 
that the companies operating in Lebanon have highly effective corporate governance, 
have a strong board of directors, have an active audit committee, have an effective top 
management, and good external auditors.  
It should be stated that, after the bankruptcies of large companies mainly in 2002 
financial crisis, maintaining corporate governance became the concern of companies in 
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order to gain the public’s support and confidence. Thus, the main demanding concern 
shifted towards corporate governance, and the results here showed that companies are 
achieving good corporate governance. 
On the other side, companies tend to have a strong internal audit quality in order to 
achieve good corporate governance and protect the company from deceptive financials. 
Thus, all respondents working in different companies proved that companies tend to 
excel in terms of sustaining quality corporate governance. 
 
4.2      Correlation Matrix 
Corporate governance effectiveness score 
 IAES IAIS IARS IAQS 
CGES Pearson Correlation .349** .320** .087 .285** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .001 .382 .003 
N 103 103 103 103 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
Table 2: Correlation analysis of CGES with IAES and its sub-measures 
N.B: the results didn’t show high correlation among the independent variables. 
Based on the correlation matrix, at a 0.01 level of significance, a correlation exists 
between the CGES and IAES. Also, both IAIS and IAQS have a positive significant 
relationship with CGES.  
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Maintaining effective corporate governance would assess the effectiveness of internal 
audit, since in the aim of improving the organizational performance, having an effective 
internal audit lies in having strong corporate governance. Corporate governance 
effectiveness can be defined as the link between corporate directors, management, and 
its financial system (Levitt, 2000). Thus, relationship among various corporate 
governance components exists. Moreover, corporate governance effectiveness has a 
significant effect on internal audit independence, because good corporate governance 
practices ensure that internal audits are acting independently (Hermanson & Rittenberg, 
2003). Also, stated by IIA (2006), that internal auditing acts as independent assurance to 
the corporation in order to improve the effectiveness of governance processes. Thus, the 
corporate governance effectiveness influences the internal audits independence in the 
corporation. 
However, there is no significant relationship between CGES and IARS. IARS is related 
to the internal audit reliability score. Thus, these results imply that the corporate 
governance effectiveness influences both the independence and qualifications of the 
internal audits staff. However, the reliability of the internal audit staff is not influenced 
by the corporate governance effectiveness, which in fact is true since the trustworthiness 
of internal audits, should not be affected by any other factor within the corporation. As 
stated by The IIA (2009), internal auditors must always provide reliable and truthful 
operational and financial information. In addition, corporate governance components 
always assure that qualified staff possesses expertise in their field. 
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Board of Directors effectiveness score 
 IAES IAIS IARS IAQS 
BDES Pearson Correlation 
-.028 .066 -.019 -.069 
Sig. (2-tailed) .780 .506 .850 .492 
N 103 103 103 103 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
Table 3: Correlation analysis of BDES with IAES and its sub-measures 
 
Based on the correlation matrix, no correlation exists between BDES, and IAES and any 
of the 3 sub-measures. H1, H1a, H1b, and H1c are rejected at the 99% level of confidence. 
Based on this result, it can be deduced that the effectiveness of the board of directors 
doesn’t have a significant effect on any internal audit score. One can notice from the 
above results that the board of directors’ responsibility is to direct the company as a 
whole, not to monitor particular departments; therefore, their work effectiveness doesn’t 
influence the independence, the reliability, and the qualifications of internal audits since 
they don’t monitor internal audit’s work.  The results could be explained by the King II 
principles, where it’s considered that achieving good corporate governance depends on 
maintaining the independence of the board of directors (Institute of Directors, 2002). 
The National Association of Corporate Directors stated that the board of directors should 
act independently in the corporation and their main role is to oversee the performance of 
the whole corporation and to manage the business (NACD, 1996). Also, a popular 
acronym stated by National Association of Corporate Directors that the board of 
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directors’ duties is “nose in, fingers out” which mean that board of directors oversees the 
corporation but do not interfere in the daily activities of the company (NACD, 1996). 
 Similarly, stated by the IIA (2009), internal audits should act independently in the 
corporation to deliver better accomplished tasks. Thus, the board of directors doesn’t 
influence the independence of internal audits. Moreover, since internal audit is 
considered as the most effective tool to enhance the corporation performance, having 
independent internal auditors is essential to deliver accurate financial reports and 
evaluate the well-functioning of the company (FareedMastan, et al., 2015). Thus, in any 
corporation, having independent internal auditors is essential for better governance. 
 
Audit Committee effectiveness score 
 
 IAES IAIS IARS IAQS 
ACES Pearson Correlation 
.476** .422** .104 .411** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .297 .000 
N 103 103 103 103 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
Table 4: Correlation analysis of ACES with IAES and its sub-measures 
Based on the correlation matrix, at a level of significance 0.01 a significant positive 
correlation exists between ACES and IAES, IAIS, and IAQS. However, it was found 
that no correlation exists between ACES and IARS which stands for the reliability of 
internal audits. H2b is rejected at the 99% level of confidence. The audit committee has a 
significant effect on internal audit effectiveness in general and on its independence and 
qualifications of staff. One can notice from the above results that the audit committee 
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enhances the independence of internal audit, and ensures having qualified staff in the 
corporation, so audit committee’s responsibility is to monitor the effectiveness of 
internal audits. First, stated by an audit committee chairperson that internal audit is seen 
as the “eyes and ears for the audit committee”, and the audit committee has an oversight 
role by reviewing internal audits’ qualifications and its effectiveness (Steinberg & 
Bromilow, 2000). Thus, the audit committees’ important role is to ensure that internal 
audit tasks are effectively performed. Also, as stated by Davies (2009) that both audit 
committee and internal audits can achieve effective tasks if they both worked as a team 
and the appointment of the head of internal audits is done by the audit committee 
(Davies, 2009).  Also, the audit committee requires independent evaluation from the 
internal audits on financial reporting (Hermanson & Rittenberg, 2003). This supports 
that the effectiveness of the audit committee has a significant effect on internal audit 
tasks. Moreover, his could be explained by the report done by The National Commission 
on Fraudulent Financial Reporting (1987), where it was stated that an independent audit 
committee can distract internal audits independence. Thus, the audit committee’s 
effectiveness has an effect on internal audit effectiveness. Moreover, the audit 
committee aims to appoint an internal audit director that demonstrates independence, 
objectivity, and has leadership abilities (Stuart, 2008; Steinberg & Bromilow, 2000). 
Thus, this will achieve operative independence and effective internal audit tasks. In 
short, having an effective audit committee can improve or protect the independence of 
internal audit department, and also they ensure on implementing the recommendations 
of internal audits and since the audit committee reviews the work accomplished by 
internal audits, they can recognize the internal audits qualification. Therefore, as stated 
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by FareedMastan et al. (2015), having an ineffective audit committee or its absence 
tends to make the internal audit department ineffective. 
 
Top Management effectiveness score 
 IAES IAIS IARS IAQS 
TMES Pearson Correlation 
.514** .289** .335** .362** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .003 .001 .000 
N 103 103 103 103 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
Table 5: Correlation analysis of TMES with IAES and its sub-measures 
Based on the correlation matrix, at a level of significance 0.01 significant positive 
correlation exists between TMES and both IAES, IAIS, IARS and IAQS. Internal 
auditors are often referred as the “eyes and ears” of management in the corporation. 
Thus, top management plays an important role in assessing internal control (Hermanson 
& Rittenberg, 2003). It can be concluded from the correlation table that top management 
effectiveness has a significant effect on the independence, reliability, and qualifications 
of the staff. These results can be explained by the fact that top management requires 
other departments’ support; also reliability could be affected since internal audit reports 
to two different groups in the corporation. Top management often calls for assurance on 
an effective and efficient corporate process from the internal audits, thus it can be 
concluded that top management’s monitor staff accomplished work and oversight if they 
are performing well. Thus, this affects the type of staff this corporation has (Hermanson 
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& Rittenberg, 2003). Also, management’s internal control effectiveness is appraised by 
the internal audits, thus an effective work accomplished by top management would have 
an effect on internal audit tasks. 
 Top management effectiveness has a significant impact on the independence of internal 
audit since it requires their assurance on monitoring risks by requiring their assessment 
in achieving governance effectiveness, also it affects their reliability since the internal 
audits face conflicts and pressures by reporting both to the top management and audit 
committee, and finally it also affects the qualifications of the staff since maintaining a 
qualified internal auditor is necessary to have an effective task accomplished 
(Hermanson & Rittenberg, 2003). Also, stated by FareedMastan et al. (2015), that the 
duty of top management is to ensure having an effective internal audit unit by providing 
a strong and communicated audit charter. Thus, this will strengthen the effectiveness of 
internal auditors.  
External Auditors effectiveness score 
 IAES IAIS IARS IAQS 
EAES Pearson Correlation 
-.176 -.090 -.151 -.100 
Sig. (2-tailed) .075 .365 .127 .317 
N 103 103 103 103 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
Table 6: Correlation analysis of EAES with IAES and its sub-measures 
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Based on the correlation matrix, no significant correlation exists between EAES, and 
IAES, IAIS, IARS, IAQS. Thus, H4, H4a, H4b, and H4c are rejected at the 99% level of 
confidence. However, for further analysis, it should be stated that a negative relationship 
exists between EAES and all the internal audits scores. It can be deduced that, external 
auditors’ effectiveness doesn’t influence the independence, reliability, and qualification 
of the staff of internal audits. In a coordinated working environment both internal and 
external auditors work independently (Felix et al., 1998). As mentioned in the literature 
part, internal audits have an advantage over external audits in determining problems at a 
prior stage (Xiangddong, 1997). Thus, the external auditors’ effectiveness doesn’t have 
an effect on internal audits since tasks are not coordinated effectively between both 
parties. Furthermore, the results could be explained by the independent operations both 
auditors accomplish (Balkaran, 2008). Thus, by having different duties towards the 
corporation, each party functions according to their job and duties, so external auditors’ 
effectiveness doesn’t have an effect on internal audits tasks. Lastly, the negative 
relationship that exits between them could be supported by the fact that both must 
organize tasks together in order to avoid wasting time on tasks previously performed 
(Mihret & Admassu, 2011). 
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4.3      Multiple Regression 
 
         Independent variables                                         Dependent variables 
        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
After examining each component’s effect alone on the overall internal audit 
effectiveness and on each sub-measure of the internal audit task, multiple regression is 
required in order to examine the effect of these four components together on internal 
audit tasks. As mentioned earlier in the literature part, in any corporation, the 
coordination between the components of corporate governance is essential to achieve 
good performance. Thus, examining the four components together on internal audits is 
required.  
Independent Variables: BDES, ACES, TMES, and EAES. 
Dependent Variable: IAES 
Model Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
B Std. Error Beta 
1 
(Constant) 3.149 .303  10.378 .000 
BDES .048 .060 .066 .799 .426 
ACES .235 .055 .462 4.300 .000 
TMES .140 .053 .263 2.646 .009 
EAES -.163 .037 -.404 -4.431 .000 
 
Table 7: Multiple regression of corporate governance components with IAES 
 
BDES 
ACES 
TMES 
EAES 
IAES 
IAIS 
IARS 
IAQS 
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Based on the multiple regression analysis, new results were deduced. First, the four 
independent components BDES, ACES, TMES, and EAES were combined together to 
analyze their effect on IAES. The results were as stated by previous analysis tools except 
for the external auditors. BDES doesn’t have a significant effect on IAES, ACES have a 
significant positive effect on IAES, TMES have a significant positive effect on IAES, 
and EAES have a significant negative effect on IAES. It is important to mention here 
that external auditors hypothesis which was eliminated by previous tests, is now 
acceptable after taking the four components together. The results of external auditors 
changed here because of the four components combined together. The audit committee’s 
responsibility is to ensure the effective relationship between both external auditors and 
internal audits (Steinberg & Bromilow, 2000). Thus, by combining the ACES and EAES 
this resulted in a significant effect of the external auditors on internal auditors in the 
presence of audit committee. As mentioned by Schneider (2009), that work and efforts 
presented by internal audits are not appreciated by external auditors, so this leads to the 
dissatisfaction of internal audits due to the lack of coordination between both parties. 
Also, a survey was done by Taylor & Glezen (1997) which stated that external auditors 
frequently ask senior internal auditors to perform junior tasks. This ineffective 
relationship was shown by the negative significance. External auditors’ influences the 
effectiveness of internal audits since the coordination between both is not supervised by 
a higher authoring in the corporation. Also, Felix et al. (1998) stated that the interactions 
that exist between both external and internal auditors tend to enhance the effectiveness 
of the financial statement audit done by internal audit department. Thus, coordinating 
activities between both groups, would lead to an effective audit work. 
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Independent Variables: BDES, ACES, TMES, and EAES. 
Dependent Variable: IAIS 
Model Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
B Std. Error Beta 
1 
(Constant) 3.077 .458  6.710 .000 
BDES .137 .090 .142 1.516 .133 
ACES .386 .083 .564 4.660 .000 
TMES -.022 .080 -.031 -.281 .779 
EAES -.195 .056 -.360 -3.499 .001 
 
Table 8: Multiple regression of corporate governance components with IAIS 
 
Based on the multiple regression analysis, BDES and TMES don’t have a significant 
effect on IAIS. On the other hand, ACES has a significant positive effect on IAIS while 
EAES has a significant negative effect on IAIS. The analysis here is different than the 
previous results. Previously, TMES had a significant influence on IAIS, and EAES 
didn’t have a significant influence on IAIS. Top management here doesn’t have a 
significant effect on the independence of internal control. The change in the results here 
is due to the presence of audit committee component as a combination of different 
components together. This could be explained by the fact that internal audits reports 
directly to the audit committee not to top management, this will tend to allow internal 
audit to act independently without referring to top management (Hermanson & 
Rittenberg, 2003). Also, as previously stated that the audit committee has an outstanding 
role in achieving effective corporate governance, so audit committee’s superior role had 
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trusted internal audits to directly report to the audit committee, and not to the top 
management (Hermanson & Rittenberg, 2003). Moreover, stated by FareedMastan et al. 
(2015), a professional audit committee should be independent from top management and 
this would boost the independence of internal audit department. Therefore, the existence 
of proficient audit committee will limit top management’s authorities. In addition, EAES 
resulted in a negative significant influence on IAIS. This implies that external auditors 
influence the independence of internal audits. The reason behind the change in the 
results is that the audit committee is not effectively separating the independence of both 
groups. Moreover, corporations tend to use external auditors to perform internal audits 
tasks in order to cut costs, so this might lead to conflict of interests without maintaining 
the independence of both parties (Gray & Manson, 2011). 
Also, internal auditors contribute the most to the financial statement disagreement that 
exists between both groups since the interference of external auditors in the financial 
statement would lead to an ineffective relationship between both groups. 
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Independent Variables: BDES, ACES, TMES, and EAES. 
Dependent Variable: IARS 
 
Model Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
B Std. Error Beta 
1 
(Constant) 3.324 .534  6.220 .000 
BDES .045 .105 .043 .430 .668 
ACES -.059 .096 -.081 -.617 .539 
TMES .307 .093 .399 3.299 .001 
EAES -.102 .065 -.174 -1.567 .120 
 
Table 9: Multiple regression of corporate governance components with IARS 
 
Based on the multiple regression analysis, the results here are consistent with previous 
analysis tools. BDES, ACES, and EAES don’t have a significant effect on the reliability 
of internal audits. These results in fact prove that the internal audits tested are reliable 
and trustworthy and this trustworthiness is not affected by higher authorities. However, 
TMES has a significant influence on the reliability of internal audits. In any corporation, 
the information is all centralized by top management that supports other divisions with 
the information they acquire. Top management supports the internal audits by all 
documentations or information represented by management, thus, the reliability and 
basis of the information obtained relies on the management being reliable in the 
evidence supported to the internal audits (Office of the Auditor General of Canada, 
2013). 
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Independent Variables: BDES, ACES, TMES, and EAES. 
Dependent Variable: IAQS 
 
Model Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
B Std. Error Beta 
1 
(Constant) 3.033 .614  4.940 .000 
BDES -.021 .121 -.017 -.175 .862 
ACES .410 .111 .453 3.704 .000 
TMES .102 .107 .109 .958 .340 
EAES -.199 .074 -.278 -2.678 .009 
 
Table 10: Multiple regression of corporate governance components with IAQS 
 
Based on the multiple regression analysis, BDES and ACES had the same results tested 
in the previous analysis.  Previously, TMES had a significant influence on IAQS and 
EAES didn’t have a significant influence on IAQS. However, based on the results, 
TMES had no significant influence on the qualifications of internal audit staff, and 
external auditors had an influence on internal audit staff. After combining the four 
components together, the additional output to be highlighted is first the resulting 
significant level of external auditors’ effectiveness on the qualification of internal audits’ 
staff. The difference in the results could be explained that the corporation hires external 
auditors to work as internal audits, and the work between both parties is coordinated. 
This could be explained by the fact that external auditors assess and review the work of 
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internal auditors (Public Oversight Board Staff, 2002). Thus, by reviewing the work 
done by internal auditors, external auditors can decide if the tasks performed are based 
on having qualified internal audits. In addition, external auditors identify internal 
auditors as being their assistant in the corporation helping them in maintaining internal 
control procedures (Felix et al., 1998). Therefore, having qualified internal auditors is 
highly demanded by external auditors. However, internal auditors perceive themselves 
as more significant contributors to the corporation than external auditors (Felix et al., 
1998). Thus, the negative significant relationship could be explained by how both 
internal and external auditors perceive each other. Also, after combining the four 
components, top management effectiveness doesn’t have a significant effect on the 
qualification of the internal audit tasks. This could be explained by the fact that internal 
audits works directly with audit committee and not with top management. Moreover, in 
a previously done survey, 70% of internal audit directors stated that the employment 
decisions by management should be approved by the audit committee (Steinberg & 
Bromilow, 2000). Also, stated in this survey that 49% of the audit committees had an 
ultimate authority in the corporation to evaluate the work of internal audits. Thus, it can 
be deduced that the audit committee has higher authority on internal auditors. 
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4.4       Backward Elimination Regression 
 
Model 1: independent variables: EAES, TMES, BDES, ACES 
Model 2: independent variables: EAES, TMES, ACES 
Dependent Variable: IAES 
 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .652a .425 .402 .18354 
2 .649b .421 .404 .18320 
 
Model Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
B Std. Error Beta 
1 
(Constant) 3.149 .303  10.378 .000 
BDES .048 .060 .066 .799 .426 
ACES .235 .055 .462 4.300 .000 
TMES .140 .053 .263 2.646 .009 
EAES -.163 .037 -.404 -4.431 .000 
2 
(Constant) 3.313 .224  14.808 .000 
ACES .233 .055 .458 4.272 .000 
TMES .141 .053 .266 2.679 .009 
EAES -.152 .034 -.377 -4.460 .000 
Table 18: Backward elimination multiple regression analysis of corporate 
governance components with IAES 
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Based on the overall model, since not all variables are significant the aim is to remove 
the non-significant variables so that the overall model becomes significant, and proving 
that the R2 won’t be affected. Thus, the combination of the rest of the components will 
provide a new significant overall model. 
Based on the above table, after eliminating the independent variable: board of directors 
effectiveness score (BDES), the overall new model becomes significant with three 
independent variables: audit committee effectiveness score (ACES), top management 
effectiveness score (TMES), and external auditors effectiveness score (EAES). 
R2 is known as the coefficient of multiple determination for multiple regression. In the 
first model, 42.5% of internal audit effectiveness is explained by the four corporate 
components BDES, ACES, TMES, and EAES. However, in the second model, 42.1% of 
internal audit effectiveness is explained by the three left corporate components ACES, 
TMES, and EAES after eliminating the board of directors (BDES). Thus, by eliminating 
the non-significant independent variable this won’t affect the R2.  
In conclusion, this test aims to prove that the multiple regression test done previously is 
valid as shown here. By removing the insignificant variable, the model R2 won’t be 
affected and thus a significant model will be presented. 
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Chapter V 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
This section includes: summary of the study, conclusion and recommendations, and 
future research. 
5.1 Summary 
This study was conducted in order to investigate the corporate governance components’ 
influence on internal audit tasks. Each chapter aimed to examine the research topic. In 
order to perform this research, data was collected from different departments in order to 
investigate the influence of board of directors, audit committee, top management, and 
external auditors on the independence, reliability, and qualifications of internal audits. 
First, chapter I included a background for corporate governance and its importance to 
the corporation, then it included the reason why this study should be done by stating the 
increased concern on corporate governance. Moreover, chapter II included prior studies 
in order to come up with the hypotheses aimed to be tested. Several points of view were 
presented that negotiated the existence of corporate governance components’ influence 
on internal audit tasks. Then, the methodology of the study was presented in chapter III. 
Here independent and dependent variables were identified, an explanation on the 
measurement techniques used was provided, and the size of the sample was stated. After 
that, chapter IV included the finding analysis and discussion. Here different tests were 
used to test the hypotheses. First, by using correlation matrix analysis, the results 
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showed significant influence of corporate governance effectiveness on internal audits 
effectiveness. Also, a significant influence was detected between each component effect 
alone on the sub-measures of internal audits; particularly the audit committee and top 
management. In contrast, no significant influence was shown by both external auditors 
and board of directors on internal audits. Then, multiple regression analysis was used to 
test the four corporate components together. Here, different results were obtained due to 
the fact that in a real functional corporation, a single component cannot affect the 
internal audits alone, but the combination of different components together would 
provide more accurate results. In the multiple regression analysis, the board of directors’ 
score remained insignificant with internal audits score, while external auditors score had 
a significant negative relationship with internal audits score. On the other hand, the audit 
committee remained significant; while top management score showed different results 
while performing the test with internal audits sub-measures. However, several reasons 
were stated to support the change in the results by undergoing different tests.  Finally, a 
backward elimination test was performed to show that eliminating the insignificant 
component won’t affect the overall statistical measure of the test.  
 
5.2 Conclusion and Recommendations 
Recently, the major focus of corporations shifted toward maintaining good governance 
by highlighting the role of each corporate governance component. The aim of this study 
was to show the effectiveness of board of directors, audit committee, top management, 
and external auditors on internal audits. Proving the existence of this influence would 
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allow companies to direct their corporate governance in a better way. Based on the 
findings, in order to improve the corporate governance of companies first, the audit 
committee has a role to strengthen the effectiveness of internal audit by guarding their 
independence and should ensure that the internal audits should not function under the 
supervision of top management. For example, they should provide accurate results and 
prepare budget plans without the influence of top management. In addition, better 
corporate governance could be achieved if both the external audits and internal audits 
coordinated work between each other. This would save time and money to the company.  
 
5.3 Future Research 
Further research could be conducted to test the corporate governance components’ 
effectiveness on internal audit tasks effectiveness. First, developing 5 questionnaires is 
necessary. Each group, the board of directors, audit committee, top management, 
external auditors, and internal audit unit would have a separate questionnaire which is 
essential to differentiate each group’s point of view. Thus, this will provide more 
accuracy regarding the hypotheses aimed to be investigated. Also, examining the 
relationship between the four corporate governance components is essential to identify 
which component influences internal audit unit the most. This is crucial to enhance the 
coordination between groups which will enhance the organizational performance. 
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Appendix “A” 
Part I:  General Questions:  Please tick ( ) in the appropriate box for the answer. 
 
1–Gender:                          - Male                  - Female   
2–Age:                              - less than 30             - from 30-40            - and more than 40 
3–Degree Level:     - Baccalaureate          - Bachelor          - Master degree         - PhD 
4–Specialization:  -Accounting and Auditing            - Banking Science      
                                - Business Administration             - another set 
5–Years of Experience:     - less than 5 years         - from 5 to 10         - more than 10 years 
6–Professional Certificate:  -CFA           -CPA            -CIA         -another set           -no 
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Part II: This part relates to the determinants of Corporate Governance effectiveness.  
Please tick () the box that reflects the degree of your agreement to all of the following: 
 Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
Disagree 
1. The Board of Directors is formed of 
independent members. 
     
2. The Board members have sufficient 
knowledge and experience. 
     
3. The Board members have enough time 
to serve effectively. 
     
4. Four or more Board meeting is held 
per annum. 
    
 
 
5. The audit committee is formed of 
independent members. 
     
6. The Audit Committee comprises at 
least one member who is financially literate. 
     
7. The Audit Committee approves the 
internal audit plan and major changes to the 
plan. 
     
8. The Audit Committee reviews the 
internal audit reports. 
     
9. Audit committee appoints, evaluates 
the performance and dismisses the Head of 
Internal Audit. 
     
10. There is good collaboration of work 
between internal auditors and audit committee 
members. 
     
11. The internal control procedures as 
described in the policy procedures manuals are 
effective. 
     
12. The internal control procedures as 
described in the policy procedures manuals are 
actually applied. 
     
13. One of the Big 4 accounting firms is 
the external Auditor. 
     
14. There is good coordination of work 
between the internal and external auditors. 
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Part III: This part relates to the quality effectiveness of the Internal Audit task. 
Please tick () the box that reflects the degree of your agreement to all of the following: 
 
 
 
 
 
Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
Disagree 
1. The head of internal audit has a 
functional reporting line to the Audit 
Committee Chairman. 
     
2. The head of internal audit has an 
administrative reporting line to the CEO. 
     
3. The Internal Audit plan and budget 
are prepared without the contribution of 
senior management. 
     
4. The head of internal audit meets 
privately with the board or audit committee 
chairperson without management attendance. 
     
5.  The internal audit department has a 
formal strategy in the form of an audit 
charter. 
     
6. The Internal Audit function complies 
with Government Internal Audit Standards. 
     
7. Internal audit function reconsiders 
the boards' strategy and its directions to 
protect the interests of shareholders. 
     
8. Internal audit reports are sent in time 
to prevent fraud and illegal acts to the 
appropriate management level 
     
9. Internal auditors have complete 
access to records and people that will enable 
them to achieve the quality of the job. 
     
10. Internal Auditors have received 
adequate training on a continuing basis for 
them to carry out their duties. 
     
11. Internal auditors have the experience 
and expertise that assist them in achieving the 
quality of the job. 
     
12. The majority of the Internal Audit 
staff holds professional certifications. 
     
13. The Head of Internal Audit has the 
right skills and experience. 
     
14. The Head of Internal Audit brings 
rounded business experience to the job rather 
than coming straight form a pure auditing 
background. 
     
